

**Analyzing Iranian Leaders' Conflict Framing
With Leximancer Automated Text Analysis**

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ABSTRACT

The purpose of this paper is to report the results of an automated text analysis (ATA) of a sample of speeches made by the two current top leaders of the Iranian government: Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and President Hassan Rouhani. These speeches yield corpora of public discourse produced by the two main national Iranian leaders. The objective is to examine the framing of peace and conflict done by these two leaders in order to develop more knowledge about Iran's positioning in the political communication between Iran and the United States. It is hoped that findings from this type of research can contribute to improving assessments that are made regarding the ongoing negotiations involving Iran and the United States. Three research questions are addressed in this study. All center upon a central concern regarding how Iranian political discourse has moved toward peace framing or conflict framing in the discourse of its top leaders. To answer these research questions, the study employs an ATA program called Leximancer. Qualitative content analysis (human coding) is used to augment the ATA. Our findings indicate the framing done by the president of Iran differs from the framing done by the nation's Supreme Leader. The latter uses more conflict framing than the former. Implications for future studies and communication between the two nations are addressed.

Introduction

The objective of the study reported here is to increase the understanding we have of the political communication involving the United States and Iran. A deeper analysis of Iranian political discourse can be accomplished using a framing analysis that helps to make the political communication between the two nations more cooperative, or at least more effective in terms of knowing the key concerns of both sides.

In current events, we witness continued concern regarding the political posturing of Iran and the United States in relation to each other. Many nations are concerned about the possible nuclear weapons development intentions of Iran. With the crisis of the ISIS insurgency in Iraq and Syria today, observers also wonder if the United States and Iran might work together against this common enemy. Many experts note that there is a continuing "war of words" between the two nations. Some observers are perplexed by this because it sometimes looks more like a rhetorical game than a precursor to armed conflict. Others disagree and see armed conflict as emerging from a discursive framing of violence or war as necessities. By utilizing recent speeches of Iran's political head, President Hassan Rouhani, and Iran's religious head, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, it is possible to learn more about both the manifest and latent political and ideological posturing of the nation's leadership. This is a more rational alternative than the second guessing about Iranian trustworthiness done by many American politicians and pundits. Leximancer automated text analysis (ATA) software is used in this study to identify the initial semantic structure of the body of speeches as a whole for each speaker. Leximancer helps to identify both manifest and latent concepts in texts which can be missed by human coding or filtering due to researcher bias. The researchers apply framing analysis to guide the identification of possible meanings that emerge from the ATA-identified most prevalent concepts and co-occurrences of concepts. Finally, to determine whether the ATA analysis is consistent with traditional human coding and analysis, the researchers submit the results to comparison with the consensual framing analysis of the speeches by three scholars who study political communication.

Political Climate Between Iran and the U.S.

The United States and Iran in recent months have conducted crucial negotiations regarding the

Iranian nuclear plants and possible steps toward developing nuclear weapons. Yet reactions to the most recent negotiated agreement made by the P + 5 nations (Iran, United States, France, China, Russia, United Kingdom), in the United States and in the world are radically different. President Obama praises the deal as step toward peace and says the deal will cut off the development of nuclear weapons by Iran (The Week, 2015). Meanwhile, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu frames the deal as a disaster leading to inevitable war in the region and he calls it a “mistake of historic proportions.” (The Week, 2015, p. 2).

In both nations, there are camps that seek to continue negotiations with the other side while there are other factions that seek confrontation. In the U.S., for example, there are hardliners who call for military action against Iran. Some of the latter appear to be looking for reasons to launch military strikes on Iran (Hersch, 2006; Kroenig, 2014). Some observers even think that these hardliners are seeking ways to provoke Iranian actions that can be used as *casus belli* (Hersch, 2006). Against this rhetorical backdrop emerge issues of what the two nations actually mean in their discourse and how they will negotiate their differences if they decide to.

With or without nuclear weapons, Iran has been a strong regional power. Iranian national security concerns include preventing the rise of another antagonistic Iraq and blocking the U.S. from seeking to change its government. The Iranians view the U.S. as their largest national security threat (Friedman, 2011). However, Friedman (2011) argues that “Iran’s anti-Israeli rhetoric has been extreme, but its actions have been cautious” (p. 114). He suggests that aggressive Iranian rhetoric is sometimes used to cover its inaction in dealing with domestic economic situations. Claims about Iranian aggressive discourse being aggressive rhetoric rather than violent action have not stopped some Israeli and U.S. leaders from threatening a missile strike on Iranian nuclear plants. For example, recent news reports indicate that President Obama is willing to use various strategies in dealing with Iran that include negotiations, diplomacy, cyber-attacks on nuclear facilities, increasingly severe (“crippling”) sanctions and—military strikes. In March 2012, Obama stated to the American Israel Public Affairs Committee, “I will not hesitate to use force when it is necessary to defend the United States and its interests” (Calabresi,

2013, p. 22). The Pentagon recently created the largest military buildup of forces in the Persian Gulf since 2003 (Calabresi, 2013). At the same time, Iranian forces were also building up in the region. Both nations claimed necessity for what they frame as defensive preparations.

One reason why various leaders in the United States distrust Iran stems from the fact that Iran has sent mixed messages to the U.S. (Pollack & Takeyh, 2005). The leadership of Iran often defines its policies in terms of a necessary opposition to the U.S. and its allies. However, this opposition is not only discursive; the Iranians have also taken actions like supporting terrorist organizations such as Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in Palestine (Pollack & Takeyh, 2005). There is evidence that they supported a direct attack on U.S. interests in the form of the Khobar Towers' bombing. This apartment building housed American troops in 1996 (Pollack & Takeyh, 2005).

While the Supreme Leader of Iran, Ali Khamenei, distrusts the U.S. and joins others in labeling the U.S. as the "Great Satan," he is said to have felt sympathy for Americans at the time of the 9/11 attacks (Hirsh & Bahari, 2007). Rather than supporting the Taliban, Iran supported the Afghan fighters (the Northern Alliance), who fought the Taliban. Iran had opposed the Taliban for years before the 9/11 attacks by Al Qaeda. In November 2001, Iran sent a representative to meet with the U.S. and 18 other nations in Bonn, Germany, to talk about an interim Afghan Government. Because of the mixed signals in Iranian discourse and actions, there is divergence in assessing whether the Iranians mainly seek peace or whether they seek conflict.

In this study, we seek to learn more about how the two top leaders of Iran frame peace and conflict. No attempt is made in this study to finalize an assessment of Iranian intentions or planning. Rather, we will focus on how the two most powerful leaders of Iran are framing the issues and whether their rhetoric aligns with the current assessment by experts in Iran-US political relations. What makes this research compelling is the reality that American foreign policy and military operations decisions stem from how America's leaders interpret the discourse of the Iranian leaders in addition to how they frame the conflict themselves. This type of research can inform both strategic threat assessments and efforts at diplomacy and negotiation. It can also help political communication scholars identify the complex trends

and directions of communication by a nation-state that is involved in conflicted relationship with the United States. A common and valid method of examining patterns of political discourse is framing analysis derived from Framing Theory.

Framing Theory

Framing theory explains how people organize, classify, and interpret information in their daily lives and how messages can be constructed to influence those interpretations. Framing theory is one of the most common theories in political communication research, in part because it gives researchers a starting point and common framework from which to discuss main themes, concepts, and arguments in political discourse (Chong & Druckman, 2007). Frames, whether cognitive, media-based, or socially constructed, function to reduce the complexity of various political communication topics down to key characterizations, making assessments and decisions easier. As Vertzberger (1990) notes, beliefs provide leaders with convenient ways of making sense of confusing arrays of signals in political situations. The system of beliefs held by political leaders sets boundaries for interpretations of the situations. Ellis (2006) notes that an understanding of the complexity of communication involved in political conflicts is necessary to manage or lessen those conflicts. This implies that a greater knowledge of conflict framing can determine how we handle conflicts.

Research on framing in international conflict situations indicates that political parties that categorize all parties opposed to them as existential threats, continuously argue that they are being victimized by those threatening parties. Donald Ellis argues that such symbolic claims indicate that there is little likelihood of making progress toward peace. Such conflict frames are known as intractable (Ellis, 2006). The implication is that political conflicts are conflicts over framing, as much as they concern territory, influence, and force. Conflict frames encourage themes that portray adversaries as strong, if not existential, threats to national security. Intractable framing processes are related to political polarization. Polarization in political discourse can precede political violence. This may be true even if violent discourse constitutes blustering or exaggerated communication that is intended more to have discursive effects than actual planning of violence effects. In other words, violent or conflict framing can encourage

violence or it can achieve political effects other than violence. Peace frames, by contrast, are those that encourage cooperation and reconciliation (Nisbet, 2012).

As researchers have noted that Entman's definition of framing is commonly used in communication research, we use that definition here (David, et al., 2011; Entman, 1993). Therefore, framing is a process of selecting some parts of perceived realities and making them more important than other parts of the same reality. In this way, certain attributes of an object or situation are made more salient than others. After the problem is defined, frames have four dimensions or functions: suggest causes of the problems, diagnose those causes, make moral judgments about them, and suggest problem solutions (Entman, 1993). Framing influences how people understand a problem, how they evaluate it, and how they decide to act upon it. When all four functions in the framing conceptualization are present, we have what Entman calls a "fully developed frame" (p. 336). The political objective of framing is to get message receivers to accept particular characterizations of political topics (Entman, 2010).

Research Questions

Based on the historical background discussed above, and our use of framing analysis, we explore three research questions to guide our analysis of Iranian leader discourse and framing:

RQ1: Are peace frames or conflict frames most prevalent in the framing or terms in the speeches of President Hassan Rouhani in the past two years?

RQ2: Are peace frames or conflict frames most prevalent in the framing or terms in the speeches of the Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei in the year that President Hassan Rouhani has been in office?

RQ3: What are some similarities and differences in how the two leaders frame conflict and peace?

Methodology

Analyzing political or other communication with framing theory through the use of ATA is a recent endeavor in communication research. Only a few studies have attempted to employ ATA (Downey & Koenig, 2006; Mihelj, Koenig, Downey, & Stetka, 2008; Risse & Van de Steeg, 2003), and only one paper has suggested that Leximancer be used in the process (Koenig, 2006). ATA has commonly been

used with grounded theory approaches to political discourse, but not framing theory. Instead, a method known as latent class analysis (LCA) has been cited as the best measurement tool to classify the presence or absence of frames among frequent and proximal textual concepts. LCA is a process similar to factor analysis but uses categorical rather than continuous data (Magidson & Vermunt, 2001). However, social science researchers have either not understood or had limited computational training for, and access to LCA software like LEM, Latent Gold, or the Stata LCA plug in. LCA is superior to cluster analysis and factor analysis because it shares their ability to identify latent structures among data, but uses goodness of fit tests, which cluster analysis does not, and avoids violating normality and linearity of data assumptions, which happens with factor analysis of categorical data (Koenig, unpublished). We believe that Leximancer can be used in place of LCA because Leximancer's Bayesian clustering algorithm was designed to reveal latent classes from directly observed correlations (co-occurrences), much in the way multidimensional scaling, cluster analysis, and principal components analysis do (Smith, 2015, personal communication).

Fortunately, Leximancer is not new to text analysis in general. It has been vetted in diverse research arenas (Bal, Campbell, Payne, & Pitt, 2012; Leximancer, 2011; Steimel, 2014; Stewart & Gapp, 2012). However, still emerging in the literature is understanding, correct application, and full advantage taken of Leximancer's power, speed, scope, and benefits over human coding and analysis. For example, traditional content analysis often considers frequency counts of occurrences of categories defined by researchers as adequate to make generalizations about communication content such as political discourse (Simon & Xenos, 2004).

Harold Lasswell, one of the early developers of quantitative content analysis, sought to bring more objectivity to the analysis of communication content than was present in descriptive approaches to political communication (Janowitz, 1968). Additionally, human coding is generally limited to smaller data sets while automated methods can analyze very large data sets. Accordingly, Leximancer is more conducive to total or census data sets in contrast to randomized samples of 20-30% of an assumed text corpus. Roderick Hart (2013), political communication scholar and developer of the ATA program

Diction, notes that ATA programs like Leximancer and Diction may also be able to detect micro-level discourse elements from statistical patterns.

The connection of ATA to framing analysis is the assumption that frames are constructed from the strategic inclusion or exclusion of key words and phrases (Entman, 1993; David, et al., 2011). Thus, frames are viewed as discourse that is mapped out in word frequencies and co-occurrences. These patterns of word usage indicate network structures for words and frames (David et al., 2011). Leximancer's developers also assumed Lakoff's supposition that semantic meaning of words within sentences is more important than syntax and grammatical structure of text. New, meaningful structure can be built when syntax and weak semantic words are removed and only strong semantic relationships remain (Neal, n.d., <http://www.leximancer.com>).

Koenig (2006) lays out a clear argument for a four step process when it comes to using ATA for framing analysis. We follow this process, except we use Leximancer to assist in the third and fourth step, rather than employing LCA specific software, and we add a validation step with traditional framing analysis by expert consensus:

- a. interpretive data reduction and rough patterns in selected texts first by automated word co-occurrence calculations. This step provides a general statistical pattern of which terms are most frequent and which terms are most related.
- b. researcher discussions about word patterns and what frames appear to be emerging. This step allows interpretation of the statistical patterns based in political communication theory and logical inference.
- c. adjustment of Leximancer configurations to test specific frames. In this stage of analysis, the researchers go back to see if initial concepts appear meaningful in the texts, and what latent classes emerged from distilling key concepts.
- d. direct answering of our research questions with Leximancer and statistics analysis. The final step of analysis is addressing the research questions as directly as possible while also noting additional findings.

e. Validation of latent “classes” or frames generated by Leximancer by comparing themes and concept pathways to framing consensus of the texts by political communication experts

We first determined our interpretive frames as “conflict,” “peace,” and “Iran/US communication,” based on our research questions, and using an initial discursive method among experts on the research team. Using Leximancer, we next generated concept maps from a grounded theory perspective, when making initial data reductions, in order to avoid researcher bias. When discrepancies were found between the researchers’ interpretive frames and Leximancer generated latent concept clusters, we reexamined the original discursive interpretation. Third, key concepts or “key words” were identified that theoretically represent master frames. Configurations to Leximancer’s analysis protocols then were made, with careful attention to meaningful discourse—in our case, political and communication theory—to address both the third and fourth steps of Koenig’s (2006) proposal. Furthermore, we tested the proposition that Leximancer’s “themes” (concept clusters) and direct and indirect concept “pathways” could determine meaningful frames and interrelationships between frame components equally well as human coding and traditional discursive frame analysis.

Human Coding and Consensual Analysis

Despite the advantages, we recognize that ATA may miss some frame elements or important contextual features that are suggested by qualitative analysis (interpretive, hermeneutic, rhetorical). Therefore, our team of researchers independently read the speeches by Rouhani and the Supreme Leader, taking notes on each one regarding what appears most salient in terms of themes, frames, and concepts. Each researcher independently entered observations into a Google spreadsheet. Later, the group met and discussed the speeches in order to consensually code for framing. This included observations of Entman’s four frame dimensions -- problem, causes of the problems, moral judgments, and solutions to the problems. The team then met as a group to reach consensus by deliberation on the most important framing aspects of the discourse of both Iranian leaders. A validation process was thereby implemented for the ATA. A summary of qualitative observations can be found in Appendix B.

Sampling

Purposive sampling was conducted to obtain six recent speeches made by each of Iran's two most important political leaders, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, and President Hassan Rouhani. While random sampling is generally the preferred means of sampling for political discourse, Leximancer includes the derivation of stable relationships found among frequent concepts and how often they co-occur. The more text examples of potentially meaningful concepts in a study, the more accurately Leximancer can identify a stable constellation or network of meaning in a text corpus (Smith & Humphreys, 2006). Also, as communication researchers have found in the past, the more discourse a speaker provides, the more likely they are to reveal their political positioning with the use of language (van Dijk, 1998). Therefore, we sampled all of the available relevant speeches that had been translated into English from the election of 2013 until 2014, from both President Rouhani and Supreme Leader Khamenei.

The speech texts from Supreme Leader Khamenei were twice the size of the speech sample for President Rouhani. Thus, we included one additional Rouhani speech from 2005. The speech selected is the only other translated speech from Rouhani directed to the United Nations regarding the nuclear research program in Iran, of which he was director. The content of this speech related to content of current speeches from his first year of presidency, and reflected his ongoing focus on Iran's nuclear program and how the world responds to it. Its inclusion equalized the discourse/text corpora for the two leaders. We limited the study to the speeches/transcripts in English language provided by authenticated sources such as official transcripts for speeches at the United Nations or the English translation for speeches of the Supreme Leader from his own website. Appendix A shows a list of speeches used for our Leximancer analysis.

We do not assume that our study approaches the private political communication of the Iranian leaders; we are only dealing with their public arguments. We also acknowledge the fact that intentions of speakers may not be readable from structural features of texts alone. Thus, we make no claims about actual speaker intentions.

Results

Leximancer Analysis of President Rouhani Discourse

The first automated content analysis of five of President Rouhani's speeches from the 21st of September to the 25th of November, 2013, plus the United Nations speech of 2005 were conducted using Leximancer default settings. Leximancer creates dictionaries unique to the text corpus and builds thesauri from the text only. Default resolution for meaning extraction is two sentences, and paragraphs are a secondary resolution. As such, the researchers removed words from the concept seed list that were homographs, plurals, or synonyms of other concepts and that added no new or different semantic meaning. Merging of synonymous terms increases the power of what are hypothesized to be true strengths of relationships between concepts in the text of the speeches. Leximancer has one pre-determined dictionary consisting of valenced terms, either positive or negative which the researchers used. This so-called 'sentiment lens' can be applied to any dataset. Any given concept can then be assessed for categorization either predominantly in the 'favorable' category or sentiment, or 'unfavorable' category or sentiment. Table 1 lists the analysis method and software configurations used for the Rouhani analysis.

Table 1: Leximancer Software Configurations for Rouhani Speeches, 9/21-11/25/2013

Analysis Method	Content analysis into major themes and concepts
Data Collection Method	Retrieved Farsi-to-English translations of recent Rouhani speeches from websites
Data Summary	Five speeches, separate documents all in .txt format 97,174 words, 1,392 sentences
Software Tool	Leximancer Text Analytics Software
Analysis Tool Method	Leximancer uses machine learning and statistical methods to extract themes, concepts, and relationships according to co-occurrence
Software Configuration	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Stopped words: course, fact 2. Merged words into a singular concept: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a. Iran, Iranian, Iranians, Republic of Iran, Islamic Republic of Iran b. U.S., United States, America, Americans, Washington c. Europe, Europeans d. U.N. Security Council, Security Council e. Al Qaeda, -qaida, Al-qaida 3. Killed concepts: people, government, program, things, issue(s), country(s), case, situation, international 4. Added sentiment lens (favorable/unfavorable)


Figure 1 (below) shows the concept map that emerged after all configurations were made, and after the research team evaluated the concepts and themes for logical relevance and potential meaning in the context of Iran's current political climate and its relationship with the United States and the world. In Figure 1, the maroon center bubble represents the theme which emerged as most often discussed by President Rouhani. Leximancer encircles and labels possible latent themes that underlie concept clusters in the text with the most relevant concept's name. The most relevant latent theme identified in the whole text corpus is placed in the center of the map, and is colored "hotter" than other themes. Themes are analogous to factors identified in factor analysis, and equally open to interpretation of their labels. Concepts, which are developed from "evidence," or specific words in the corpus dictionary that occur frequently in similar clusters or contexts, are marked with dots and labeled with their names (named for the most frequent evidence word in its cluster).

The central theme in President Rouhani's speeches, not surprisingly is "Iran". The concepts that clustered to reveal the theme "Iran" more strongly than others were "nuclear" and "fuel." For each time Rouhani mentioned "Iran" (frequency count [f]=51), he mentioned "nuclear" (f=24) or "fuel" (f=26) within the same sentence or two, half of those times. Although "nuclear" and "fuel" were relevant to the themes nearby as well ("problems" and "power"), their strongest relationship was with "Iran." Leximancer does force a decision with each concept, making concepts mutually exclusive to each theme, just as LCA does, however, the specific words that make up the "evidence" of each concept might be shared across concepts. Direct relationships between concepts are represented by the grey connecting lines. A direct relationship means that the two concepts are more closely associated to each other than to any other concepts in the map. Proximity scores for each concept are based on the number of co-occurrences between any one concept and any other key concept, and the distances portrayed between bubbles indicate approximate strength of relationships between concepts (Randhawa, Wilden, & Hohberger, 2014: p. 6).

The map indicates that when Rouhani spoke to his government leaders or U.N. delegates after his

election (the audiences in his speeches), the topics most salient to his country were development of fuel sources through nuclear proliferation. The themes that emerged as separate from, yet proximally most related to the theme “Iran” in his speeches are visible in the bubbles closest to the maroon “Iran” bubble: “Europeans,” “power,” “UN Security Council,” “activities” and “problems.”

Figure 1. Most dominant concepts and relationships between themes in Rouhani speeches



Concepts that represent the theme “Europeans” are “reach” and “agreement.” About one third of the time Rouhani mentioned “Europe” or “Europeans” (f=54), he also stated that Iran had reached or needed to

“reach” (f=16) an “agreement” (f=18) with them (generally regarding the nuclear fuel proliferation program). Of the terms that Leximancer ranked as most likely to occur in proximity to the concept “Iran,” “relations” was the highest ranked (see Table 2). In addition to the concept maps, Leximancer creates likelihood scores, indicating how likely any concept may be related to others in the text. Table 2 ranks the most relevant concepts (10% or higher) in relation first, to all possible concepts, second to just “Iran”, and then just to “United States”. We chose to focus on “Iran” and “United States” from the list of all possible concepts, but likelihoods can be generated for any concept compared to all others. From this table, we can see first what is of foremost importance to Rouhani in the sampled speeches: Iran’s relationship with the Europeans, the events and activities associated with the IAEA and UN Security Council related to its nuclear fuel program, and how to reach agreements

The third most relevant theme after “Iran” in the analysis is “UN Security Council” (f=30). The most meaningful concepts connected to it are “United States” (f=19) and “take” (f=15). In half of the text examples that mention the “UN Security Council,” Rouhani states that the “United States” wants to or will “take” Iran to the Security Council, and this is unfavorable, in his opinion. Again, if we look at the concept map, it reveals that there is a direct relationship between “Iran” and the “Europeans,” and between the “Europeans” and the “United States,” however there is only an indirect relationship between “Iran” and the “United States,” connected through “Europeans” (indicated by grey lines). Leximancer has the advantage over simple concordance measures that can only calculate direct relationships; it can calculate indirect relationships as well, with researchers setting a threshold for how indirect a relationship can be before it is determined unrelated. Upon reading examples in the text, the researchers determined that Rouhani appears to believe that “Iran’s” relationship with the “Europeans” is what stands between “Iran” being “taken” to the “UN Security Council” by the “United States,” and this is visually represented in the map as well.

Table 2. *Rouhani Speeches Ranked Concepts*

All Concepts Rankings		Iran Concept Rankings		United States Concept Rankings		
Concept	Relevance	Iran	Likelihood	United States	Likelihood	
Europeans	100%	relations		29%	able	22%
Iran	94%	region		27%	Europeans	19%
IAEA	63%	nuclear		25%	past	18%
UN Sec. Council	56%	economic		25%	power	14%
fuel	48%	pressure		21%	important	14%
nuclear	44%	technology		21%	relations	14%
negotiations	41%	Europeans		19%	take	13%
world	41%	negotiations		18%	UN Security Council	13%
activities	37%	past		18%	use	10%
United States	35%	agreement		17%	favorable*	10%
political	35%	meeting		17%		
agreement	33%	political		16%		
time	31%	fuel		15%		
reach	30%	activities		15%		
problems	30%	power		14%		
unfavorable*	30%	world		14%		
take	28%	IAEA		12%		
pressure	26%	unfavorable*		12%		
technology	26%	reach		12%		
weapons	24%	problems		12%		
meeting	22%	able		11%		
past	20%	United States		11%		
region	20%					
peace	20%					
use	19%					
favorable*	19%					
able	17%					
power	13%					
important	13%					
relations	13%					

Relevance refers to each concept's relevance to the overall content of the speeches.

Likelihood refers to each concept's likelihood to appear in close proximity to a focal concept, such as Iran or United States.

**= a sentiment lens applied to the overall theme analysis or concept analysis in each column*

Much can be gleaned from the concept map and the likelihood scores in Table 2, but we focused on two

core findings, the sentiment lens and the indirect pathway between “Iran” and “Peace,” as that relates directly to our conflict frame analysis and specific research questions.

Sentiment lens. When Rouhani specifically spoke of Iran as a nation, interestingly, he used more “unfavorable” than favorable terms, since “favorable” was not a concept that reached more than 10% likelihood in proximity to “Iran,” unlike “unfavorable” which did reach more than 10% proximal likelihood to “Iran.” When looking at specific instances in the text, it appeared that much of his focus was on the current problems in Iran, its relationship with the rest of the world, and negative opinions held about Iran. He used fewer words for praising Iran or pointing out its strengths. In contrast, Rouhani used more favorable terms than unfavorable when discussing the United States. This may be because he sees a need for “relations,” which is a favorable term, and he uses a number of action verbs connected to the “United States” concept. We believe that these verbs indicate the perceived capability of the “United States,” especially as regards influence on Europe. Concepts such as “able,” “power,” “important,” “take,” and “use” were most associated with “United States.” It is important to note that Rouhani speaks of the Europeans much more often (100% overall relevance) in these speeches (Table 2, Column 1), than he speaks of the “United States” (35% overall relevance), and favorable terms are associated with the concept “Europeans” as well.

Iran-Peace pathway. Finally, we explored an indirect pathway in the concept map. Leximancer’s pathway analysis indicates the most direct co-occurrence path between “Iran” and “peace” are connected to or mediated by the following concepts: Iran-->nuclear (.10); nuclear-->weapons (.23); weapons-->region (.13); region-->world (.25) world-->peace (.29). At first glance, it may appear that Rouhani used language, which frames the path to peace in a sequence of terms moving from nuclear technology, to nuclear weapons, in the region, and world, and then to peace. However, upon examination of text examples, we determined that he only referred to nuclear weapons to say that he does *not* see that as a path to peace. Therefore, peace was proximally related to weapons, but our human analysis clarified the meaning of the proximity. Rouhani does regularly state that nuclear fuel development is related to peace in his region and in the world. We will examine the implications of this position in our discussion section.

Leximancer Analysis of Supreme Leader Discourse

The first content analysis of ten of the Supreme Leader's speeches from June 26, 2013 to February 8, 2014 were assessed using Leximancer's default settings. The program's default resolution for meaning extraction is two sentences, and paragraphs are a secondary resolution. As with the Rouhani analysis, the researchers removed words from the dictionary that were homographs, plurals, or synonyms that added no semantic meaning to primary concepts in the text corpus.

Table 3: Content Analysis Method and Software Configurations for SL Speeches, 6/26/13-02/08/2014

Analysis Method	Content analysis into major themes (factors) and concepts
Data Collection Method	Retrieved Farsi-to-English translations of recent SL speeches from websites
Data Summary	Ten speeches, separate documents all in .txt format 150,248 words, 2,060 sentences
Software Tool	Leximancer Text Analytics Software
Analysis Tool Method	Leximancer uses machine learning and statistical methods to extract themes (factors), concepts, and relationships according to co-occurrence
Software Configuration	1. Sentence block resolution: 4 2. Stopped words: course 3. Merged words into a singular concept: a. Iran, Iranian, Iranians, Republic of Iran, Islamic b. U.S., United States, America, Americans c. Europe, Europeans, European community d. God, Allah, Allah the exalted, Allah the merciful, Allah the omniscient, dear God e. Islam, Islamic, Muslim f. Quran, Quranic g. Zionist, Zionism h. Dr. Rouhani, Mr. Rouhani, Mr. President i. enemy, enemies 4. Killed concepts: people, government, nation, things, issue(s), country(s), different, day, certain, time, regime, arena, during, and 'used to' 5. Added sentiment lens (favorable/unfavorable)

The analysis was re-configured with newly merged concepts. After a first analysis with the default sentence block set at "2," it was determined that the proximity of many related concepts was often greater than a two sentence distance. The Supreme Leader sometimes referred to a subject, such as "arrogant

nations” up to three or four sentences before naming who the “arrogant nations” were. The sentence block setting was therefore increased to “4”. Analyses were re-run. Table 3 lists the analysis method and software configurations used for this Leximancer analysis.


Figure 2 shows the concept map that emerged after all configurations were made. In Figure 2, the maroon center bubble represents the theme which emerged as most central in Supreme Leader Khamenei's speeches. Somewhat different than Rouhani, that theme is called “Islam,” although “Iran” is also in the top four themes in his speech and co-occurs frequently with mention of “Islam.” The concepts that cluster to signify the theme “Islam” were “world,” “enemy,” and “truth.” These concepts were mentioned within the same few sentences as “Islam” half of the time. This explanation of what Islam may mean to the Supreme Leader would likely have been missed by our human coding and analysis process. We would have leaned toward linking “Islam” to more religious terms, like “Allah,” “Quran,” and “belief” or “responsibility.”

However, Khamenei's frequent use of what could be called sociopolitical terms in conjunction with “Islam” indicates that he may view “Islam” more as a political nation-state, rather than a religious faith. The two themes are proximally near each other, yet not as near as other themes. Also, there are no direct pathways (grey connecting lines) between concepts that make up “Islam,” like “world,” “enemy,” “countries,” “today,” and the concepts that make up “Allah.” In fact, the concepts that mediate (indirect relationships) “Islam” and “Allah” appear to be “Allah” finding “favor” with “Iran” and that increases “Islam's” “power” against “enemies,” or vice versa. From a reading of sample passages in the text, it appears that Khamenei believes the latter, that “Islam” standing up to its “enemies” will give “power” to “Iran,” and that will find “favor” with “Allah.” However, the researchers note that semantic relationships like this may be bidirectional and we could easily argue that Khamenei sees it both ways, based on his rhetoric.

Again, as with almost all qualitative analysis, there is a great deal of rich data to be interpreted from the concept map and likelihood rankings. In keeping with our research questions, we will focus on just two key points in this analysis: the concept of arrogant nations/enemies and the Islam-America indirect

pathway. The next most frequently discussed topic in relation to “Islam” was “arrogance,” and it was connected to 75% of all other themes. “Arrogant nations” are connected to “Islam” through “enemy” and the next most relevant theme in the speeches, “Iran.” Supreme Leader Khamenei mentions “Iran’s” “power” to stand up to “enemies” most often when discussing the nation state of “Iran” with his audiences (government officials, military and paramilitary groups, citizens and youth in Iran).

Figure 2: Most dominant concepts and relationships between themes in SL speeches



Khamenei speaks most often about the “enemies” that are shared by both “Islam” and “Iran”: “America” and other “arrogant nations,” though no other “arrogant nations” are named in his speeches, except “Zionists” (we presume his referent is Israel, since the Palestinian plight is mentioned frequently (f=10)

near the word Zionist, and the sovereign Israeli nation was established by Zionists). Also, Khamenei heavily focuses on “enemies” (f=95) in his speeches. It is the most frequent concept mentioned after “Islam” (f=215), “Iran” (f=201), and “Allah” (f=169).

Finally, the strength of the most direct co-occurrence pathway that connects the supreme leader’s conception of “Islam” with “America” is through “enemies.” The most direct proximal path between “Islam” and “America” is through the concepts Islam => world (.17); world => enemy (.48); enemy=>today (.14); today => powers (.07); powers => America (.13). Our consensual human coding supports the analysis that the Supreme Leader is framing “America” as a current “world” “power” who is a primary “enemy” of “Islam.” For further information, we consulted the Leximancer dictionary of terms that clustered to determine the concept “enemy.” Evidence included “defending,” “exerting,” “knowing,” and “standing,” which all indicate resistance to and awareness of enemies. This trend was borne out in the human coding and analysis process. Expert consensus determined that Khamenei did not paint Islam or Iran as a victim to its enemies, but instead reminded his people that they have been strong and never give up in the face of enemies. “Arrogance” was made of Leximancer dictionary evidence like “conceal,” “superior,” “egotism,” “wage,” and “terrorism.” Again, human coding and frame analysis supported ATA evidence that Supreme Leader views America as power-hungry and both overtly and covertly, willing to maintain power by any means.

Table 4. *Supreme Leader Speeches Ranked Concepts*

All Concepts Rankings		Iran Concept Rankings		United States Concept Rankings	
Concept	Relevance	Iran	Likelihood	United States	Likelihood
Allah	100%	power	50%	powers	25%
favorable*	66%	United States	30%	arrogant	20%
Islam	38%	enemy	29%	nations	20%
favor	38%	today	27%	Iran	17%
Iran	34%	favor	25%	truth	17%
important	34%	powers	25%	power	17%
arrogant	28%	favorable*	20%	events	14%
today	28%	arrogant	13%	necessary	12%
enemy	26%	nations	10%	unfavorable*	9%

world	26%	problems	9%	enemy	7%
truth	23%	unfavorable*	9%	today	7%
Quran	21%	world	7%	favorable*	6%
unfavorable*	21%	Allah	6%	favor	5%
problems	21%	important	6%		
nations	19%				
United States	19%				
believe	17%				
powers	15%				
necessary	15%				
officials	13%				
events	13%				

Relevance refers to each concept's relevance to the overall content of the speeches.

Likelihood refers to each concept's likelihood to appear in close proximity to a focal concept, such as Iran or United States.

**=a sentiment lens applied to the overall theme analysis or concept analysis in each column*

Comparison of ATA and Consensual Human Frame Analysis

Comparison of Rouhani and Khamenei.

According to both Leximancer's assessment of the overall summary of the meaningful relationships among concepts in Khamenei's speeches and our consensual human coding of the speeches, we gleaned this general message: Iran and its Islamic people have enemies, those arrogant nations in the world, like America, have powers, but Iran stands up to them today. This power comes from Iran's country officials focusing attention on important cultural issues and certain necessary responsibilities, by seeking truth from the Quran, with Allah's favor. In contrast, the general message that was revealed both by ATA and human coding in Rouhani's speeches was this: The Europeans can help Iran negotiate with the UN Security Council and the United States regarding our nuclear fuel program. We can reach agreements to solve problems over nuclear weapons and bring peace to our region.

Another difference between the two leaders regards Leximancer's determination that Rouhani focused on problems Iran is having or trying to fix the negative image the world has of Iran, whereas the Supreme Leader focused on the internal strength of Iran more so than he focused on the problems Iran is having. In

opposite fashion, Rouhani's speeches revealed more positive than negative sentiment toward the United States, whereas Khamenei's speeches were associated with more negative sentiment against the United States than positive.

ATA and conflict frames. Core themes emerged from human coding of the speeches and were discussed instead as "frames" using Entman's theory. Frames that emerged during analysis were (in no particular order): Iran, United States, Europeans, Iran-United States communication, victimization, nuclear capability, negotiations/agreements, UN Security Council, conflict, peace, rights/fairness, respect/dignity, Zion/Israel, Allah, arrogant nations, Islam, and enemies. There is much overlap between the themes generated by Leximancer and the frames identified by human coders. The team of coders applied Entman's four dimensions to three themes relevant to this study's research questions: conflict, peace, and Iran-United States communication. The total results of the qualitative coding process regarding those three key themes according to each of the four dimensions (problem, causes of the problems, moral judgments, and solutions to the problems) are contained in Appendix B. To aid in checking the validity of the Leximancer analysis regarding conflict, peace, and Iran-United States communication and relations, Table 4 contains a summary of results of the human coding dimensions for those three frames.

Table 4
Qualitative consensual coding--frame structure by speaker

Frame	Rouhani	Supreme Leader
Conflict		
Problem	name calling of Iran and denying it nuclear technology threatens both its national stability and peace stability in the region	Israel and the U.S. are enemies of Iran who work together to threaten, pressure, slander and intimidate Islamic nations
Cause	denial of our nuclear rights and fair treatment of our nation by Israel and U.S. because they have always been against us	they dislike us and they want all the power and resources in the region and world for themselves
Moral judgment	we do not deserve unjust treatment, especially by nations who have abused power themselves	they are inherently wicked, evil, and Israelis are not human; they are creatures, dogs, deserving no respect
Solution	Iran must be internally strong, stand up	Muslims need to join hands and stand up to these enemies; never retreat or give up. Iran

		to the pressure and defend its rights, using support of nations who do respect it	can strengthen itself with unity, self-sufficiency, religion and military might. Islamic nations must also be savvy of subtle cultural attacks and secret negotiations with propped up dictators
Peace	Problem	Iran must convince the world that it supports peace by being smart, judicious, moderate and hopeful, focusing on its own progress	our enemies impede our overall goal of world stability
	Cause	Iran must be believed that it only wants nuclear technology for progress, not weapons	prevent our access to nuclear technology; Iran's reliance on outside resources or help reduces our ability to be peacemakers and leaders in the region
	Moral judgment	Iran wants to share power and collectively collaborate with other nations to prevent war, which it hates. Peace is the way forward in the future	we need to be leaders in our region and respected by other powerful nations
	Solution	world must believe Iran, trust Iran, work and cooperate with Iran	follow Muslim tenets: Do good, be kind, friendly, seek justice, see all humanity as brothers (even Americans, but not their regime), be intelligent, patient, and unified
Iran-US communication	Problem	worried the U.S. might invade Iran; mistrusts negotiations with U.S. because of three failures in the past	U.S. lies, interferes, intimidates and warmongers; if it could dismantle our independent Islamic nation right now, it would
	Cause	U.S. persuades other nations to mistrust Iran; past problems and tension may be affecting current U.S.-Iran relationship	U.S. likes having power over other nations and access to their resources; with their absolute power, they think they can do no wrong nor be held accountable
	Moral judgment	Iran is not what U.S. says and sanctions and pressure make things worse; only respect and honorable negotiations will improve relationship	U.S. is arrogant, unreasonable, pessimistic, and hypocritical; willing to kill innocent people for its own interests, but says it protects human rights; in cahoots with Israel, another enemy of Iran
	Solution	Relationship could be repaired if U.S. acknowledges Iran's right to nuclear technology, negotiates with respect and dignity, in a spirit of focusing on common issues and the future	Iran will not capitulate to the U.S.

Comparing the Leximancer analysis to the qualitative content analysis regarding the three frames in Table 4, conflict, peace, and Iran-U.S. communication, we can provide the following answers to our research questions.

RQ1: Are peace frames or conflict frames most prevalent in the framing or terms in the speeches of President Hassan Rouhani in the past two years?

Our ATA indicates that for President Rouhani, themes of “reaching” “agreements” and “negotiations” are the most commonly associated themes with “Iran.” Additionally, our qualitative human coding consensus also determined that Rouhani’s stated solutions to the conflicts he saw involve Iran’s internal strength, and getting respect and fair treatment, which are non-violent solutions. We observed the presence of both peace frames and conflict frames, however. Below are some examples of his peace over conflict discourse.

“...the hope of universal acceptance by the people and the elite all across the globe of ‘yes to peace and no to war;’ and the hope of preference of dialogue over conflict, and moderation over extremism.” Rouhani, 24-Sep-13.

“The firm belief of our people and government in enduring peace, stability, tranquility, peaceful resolution of disputes and reliance on the ballot box as the basis of power, public acceptance and legitimacy, has indeed played a key role in creating such a safe environment.” Rouhani, 24-Sep-13.

“The people of Iran clearly talk to the world. The people voted for someone whose voice is moderation. People voted for someone who said that in our foreign policy we are looking for constructive interaction. We are not seeking or looking for war with any nation. We are seeking peace and stability among all nations in the region. And basically speaking, we are striving for peace and stability to be restored in the world.” Rouhani, 21-Sep-13.

RQ2: Are peace frames or conflict frames most prevalent in the framing or terms in the speeches of the Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei in the year that President Hassan Rouhani has been in office?

Since the themes “enemies,” standing up to “arrogant” world powers are the most commonly associated themes with “Iran” and “Islam,” according to the Leximancer analysis of Khamenei’s speeches, conflict framing is more prevalent than peace framing. In fact, the word peace was only mentioned four times in all ten of the Supreme Leader’s speeches, twice as part of a greeting “peace be to him,” and twice stating that Iran has been known for peaceful interactions with its Muslim brothers and other nations. This is in contrast to the 95 times the word “enemy” was mentioned. The qualitative human coding consensus also determined that Iran’s Supreme Leader mentioned conflict and enemies even when

discussing possible roads to stability, and when evaluating problems, the problems were enemies, with an implacable evil character, and with whom no negotiation or trust is possible (see Table 4). Although the Supreme Leader Khamenei spends a short amount of time discussing how the positive moral qualities of the Islamic faith, if practiced devoutly, could help promote peace, our data indicate that conflict frames are the primary focus of his speeches. Here are some examples of his recent discourse:

“The imposed war was not only waged by a neighboring country against us. It was an international war against us which benefited from all kinds of weapons. Everyone made their efforts, but they could not occupy even one millimeter of our soil.” Ali Khamenei, 28-Aug-13.

“The people should not listen to these individuals and they should see the enmity and hypocritical behavior of the enemy. In private meetings with the officials of the country, the American officials say certain things, but as soon as they leave, they say certain other things. The people of Iran should see and pay attention to the hypocritical behavior of our enemy and his evil and malevolent motives. They should realize that a country should always preserve its domestic power.” Ali Khamenei, 08-Feb-14.

“The Iranian nation is a dignified nation. The Revolution gave dignity back to the Iranian nation. The time when an American sergeant dared to slap an Iranian colonel across the face on Iranian soil is gone. The day when the officials of our dear country had to compromise with the greedy enemies is gone. The Islamic Republic made the Iranian nation dignified. This dignity prevails and it will increase on a daily basis. From now on, the responsibility of all officials and all the people of Iran is to preserve and defend this dignity. A nation can remain glorious and make progress with its original identity and with its dignity.” Ali Khamenei, 05-Oct-13.

What can be seen in these examples of his discourse is that the Supreme Leader frames the troubled relationship between the United States and Iran more in terms of conflict than in terms of peace. Indeed, the United States is framed by Khamenei as an existential threat to his nation, and as a nation that cannot be trusted to move toward cooperation and peace. This last analysis is salient to the US/Iran communication frame, more so than to the conflict frame.

RQ3: What are some similarities and differences in how the two leaders frame conflict and peace?

Our qualitative framing coding also shows that both leaders blame the conflicts on the United States and Israel. The causes for this are attributed to self-serving goals of those nations. Israel is framed as sub-human and the U.S. is framed as arrogant, dominating, and privileging Zionism over the Arab Awakening. Our qualitative data therefore indicate strong prevalence of both conflict and peace framing, however each leader endorses a somewhat different method for achieving peace, or as the Supreme

Leader tends to say instead of peace--stability and security. President Rouhani focuses on an external solution to peace--what the world should believe about Iran and how the world must help Iran to ensure peace. Supreme Leader Khamenei instead endorses an internal, or within Iran and its people, approach to achieving stability and security. He suggests that being unified, self-reliant, and standing up to enemies is the key path to peace. Both Iranian leaders indicate in their framing that peace is possible. The ATA analysis also identified similar themes among the speeches, and the sentiment lens helped identify the difference between Rouhani's and Khamenei's framing of the United States: the latter having a more unfavorable view.

Both leaders stress the need for Iran to be respected and hold a place of dignity on the world stage. They have some overlapping and some divergent ideas about how to help Iran do that, and how to engage the outside world, or hold the outside world accountable to respecting Iran. They both feel that sanctions and ongoing intense scrutiny of their nuclear technology program are unfair and hurt the future of Iran. Rouhani states that negotiations with other nations, particularly Europe, can end these two problems. Khamenei is less specific about how he thinks the unfair treatment should be dealt with. He simply emphasizes the unfairness and blames the U.S. and Israel for it. He states that his people must stand up to these offenses and strengthen themselves, not negotiating and not backing down, but we are not sure exactly what that means, or if overt attacks or conflict is being advocated by him. Our ATA analysis also echoes these themes.

Looking at the America-Iran communication framing, our qualitative observations find Rouhani discussing the problem as a series of failures in how the two nations communicate with each other, but that it still might be remedied. Khamenei describes this problem as defined by other nations seeking to prevent the Revolution of 1979 from "growing roots" and the United States being warmongering and belligerent. Rouhani frames the cause of the problem in terms of past tensions while Khamenei talks about the causes in terms of the United States being untrustworthy and criminal in its actions currently as well.

He also frames America as an enemy of Iran. This framing includes very negative framing of Israel and

links Israel with the United States as two monovalent enemies. For moral judgment on America-Iran communication, Rouhani frames an assessment as the U.S. learning that its sanctions do not work and that honorable negotiations are what do work. Khamenei talks about having no trust at all for Americans and America supporting their enemy Israel. For solutions to the inter-nation communication problem, Rouhani frames the solutions in terms of “mutual confidence and trust” being necessary, and the nations needing to remove walls of suspicion. In contrast, Khamenei says that the American government is evil, but not the American people. He does say that the “Satan” can be negotiated with in order to move forward. Our ATA analysis likewise revealed that Rouhani’s discourse indicated a desire to reach agreements and negotiate, whereas Khamenei’s discourse did not.

“Iran seeks constructive engagement with other countries based on mutual respect and common interest, and within the same framework does not seek to increase tensions with the United States. I listened carefully to the statement made by President Obama today at the General Assembly. Commensurate with the political will of the leadership in the United States and hoping that they will refrain from following the short-sighted interest of warmongering pressure groups, we can arrive at a framework to manage our differences. To this end, equal footing, mutual respect, and the recognized principles of international law should govern the interactions. Of course, we expect to hear a consistent voice from Washington.”
Rouhani, 24-Sep-13.

“We can begin by avoiding any new tension in Iran-US relationship and, at the same time, endeavor towards removing tensions that we inherited from the past; tensions that continue to mar the relations between our two countries. While we may not be able to forget the major source of mistrust and suspicion that haunted the minds of the Iranian people in their thinking about the US Governments in the past 60 years, we need however to focus rather on the current situation and look forward to the future, trying to turn the turbulent past into a beacon lighting the path ahead. As leaders, we need to rise above petty politics and lead rather than follow the various interest and pressure groups in our respective countries.”
Rouhani, 26-Sep-13.

“It is America which nations are intimidated by and which they hate.” Ali Khamenei, 08-Feb-14

“...we do not trust the government of America. We trust our own officials...” Ali Khamenei, 05-Oct-13.

“It has been 35 years now that arrogant regimes--including America and other powers--have been doing their best to work against the Islamic Republic and the people of Iran.” Ali Khamenei, 19-Jan-14.

“They think that because they imposed sanctions on Iran, it was forced to come to the negotiating table. But this was not the case. Before they said such things, we had announced that the Islamic Republic would negotiate - whenever it thinks it is expedient - with this Satan on specific issues in order to eradicate its evil deeds and solve the problems. This does not mean that the Iranian nation has become desperate. This has never been the case” Ali Khamenei, 09-Jan-14.

Discussion and Conclusions

This study is an early attempt in the field of political communication to employ framing analysis using the ATA software program Leximancer. As a result, we are able to provide uniquely informed commentary on conflict framing in international communication. We evaluated the framing of peace or conflict by the two most important national leaders of Iran today, including their representations of Iran-U.S. communication. We validated ATA findings with human coding and consensual qualitative analysis, since the use of Leximancer is fairly new in the field of content analysis of political communication. Leximancer proved to be useful at all stages of our framing analysis. We were able to conduct the bulk of all automated analyses over a ten day period, which contrasts with the six months it took for our experts to code, reduce data, and eventually coalesce upon agreed frames and meaningful relationships in the data. We did not find ATA a complete substitute for researcher-generated meaning and relationships in the text, but the large majority of conclusions we made based on ATA were substantiated by the traditional analysis.

A key finding revealed by our analysis is that both leaders of Iran feel threatened by the United States. Friedman (2011) makes a similar argument. Rouhani sees Iran's relationship with Europe as a buffer from this threat, and he focuses on building "relations" both with Europe and the United States, despite the poor history between the U.S. and Iran, to reduce the threat level. According to our analysis, Supreme Leader Khamenei takes a much more defensive stance in response to the felt pressure and threat. He emphasizes steadfast resistance and unity among Islamic peoples against the threat of the United States. Both leaders use active verbs and "power" associated adjectives when describing the U.S. The framing analysis reported here, which used ATA to locate themes in Iranian political discourse, can be seen using the leaders' own language to characterize their linguistic sentiment.

It is interesting to also note what we did not find. Specifically, we did not discover words or language that would indicate violence or war as a solution to conflict with the U.S. Neither concept map nor relevancy table contained concepts that indicated violence nor terrorist acts. The concept "weapon" that emerged in President Rouhani's discourse referred to his explicit stance against developing nuclear weapons, so the close proximity of the concept "weapons" with the concept "peace" indicates that he

repeatedly says nuclear weapons are *not* the way to achieve peace.

Another interesting finding in this study is that solutions were mentioned much less often than problems, so the solutions concepts were too infrequent to be picked up in Leximancer's prevalence ratings. On the other hand, we observed indications that both leaders of Iran express a deep desire to receive the respect of other nations, including the United States. They argue vigorously for their right to autonomy and to be treated with dignity. In fact, both saw this gain in respect and dignity as an acceptable solution to past and present conflicts, as well as an inroad to opening and improving communication lines with the United States. The Supreme Leader framed his nation as deserving a place of power in the world today and being protected by God. It might be safe to say that Khamenei would appreciate an apology for the past, whereas Rouhani would appreciate attempts to repair the present and focus on the future.

Of course, we are reminded that Klapper (2013) determined in the Worldwide Threat Assessment that Iran is developing nuclear capabilities to ensure its national security and increase its regional influence, rather than for just domestic energy needs, and leaders are conducting cost-benefit analyses of building a nuclear weapons program, despite the official "no nuclear weapons" position the administration publicly maintains. It is possible that our ATA uncovered a covert position of Rouhani in support of nuclear weapons, but we require a larger dataset to find solid support for that conclusion. However, we did not find evidence of 'escalating aggression' as Klapper (2013) asserted.

Another key conclusion of this research relates to the differences in how the two leaders of Iran perceive solutions to conflict and in particular to communication with the United States. There is a set of competing narratives (peace & conflict frames) in the two leaders of Iran. President Rouhani is more likely to frame the relationship between the United States and his nation in terms of peace than in terms of conflict, while Supreme Leader Khamenei is more likely to do the opposite. For example, the word "peace" did not make it into the concept map of the Supreme Leader because of low prevalence, whereas the word "enemy" did not make it into the concept map for President Rouhani due to low prevalence. Our findings are consistent with some of the recent journalistic accounts of how the two leaders differ. For example, within a day after President Rouhani spoke about dialogue between the United States and Iran

about Iran's nuclear program, Khamenei posted messages on Twitter referring to such talks as useless and harmful (Crowley, 2014). There is some intractability in his stances on U.S. and especially Israel. Iran views Israel as an existential enemy with people framed as less than human, while the United States is framed as having bad intentions but also some potential for cooperation in the future.

As Ellis (2006) noted, when a leader or country has an intractable frame, it is diplomatically almost impossible for negotiations to succeed. Iran views Israel as an existential enemy with people framed as less than human, while the United States is framed as having bad intentions but also some potential for cooperation in the future. The assertion that "war [is] a frightening prospect and fruitful negotiations a still-distant dream" between the United States and Iran, made by the International Crisis Group (2013, p. i), was not born out in our analysis. Neither leader's rhetoric indicated a completely intractable stance.

In terms of power, it is important to remember that the President of Iran is subordinate to the Supreme Leader, hence the expectation for convergent discourse of the two leaders will be limited. Also salient to this discussion was a key finding of the analysis: Khamenei speaks of Islam as a sociopolitical entity much more frequently than as a religious entity. In the same vein, he speaks of Iran as tied to faithful adherence to religious ideals in service of Allah, as much as to political and cultural activities and concerns. We know that the Supreme Leader's responsibility includes both maintaining the Islamic Republic's legitimacy and divine authority (Khalaji, 2012). Not surprisingly, the nation-state and religious-state of Islam-Iran appear to be equally bound to the same responsibilities and goals. This strong concordance between politics and faith, religion and cultural nationalism can be at odds with the American attempt to separate the two forces in its own country.

Recently, the Foreign Minister of the Islamic Republic of Iran made the following arguments that provide further validation of what our analysis suggested both leaders conceptualize as key issues, and how they differ on some of the solutions to those issues. First, he argued that Iran has certain "cherished ideals" and objectives which include preservation of its sovereignty and independence, enhancing its regional and global stature, promoting its ideas of Islamic democracy, helping peace "through positive

engagement,” and promoting “international understanding through dialogue and cultural interaction” (Zarif, 2014, p. 49). Minister Zarif stressed the essential nature of international norms. Second, he talked about a world increasingly related to mutual interdependence. He also criticized the United States and other nations for declaring a “clash of civilizations” and Islam as a global ideological enemy. Zarif (2014) praises President Rouhani’s efforts to promote a moderate discourse and says that “This vision aims to move Iran away from confrontation and toward dialogue, constructive interaction, and understanding...” (p. 56). In the summer of 2014, the Supreme Leader of Iran made comments attacking Israel and the United States in regard to the military offensive against Hamas by the Israeli Defense Force. In sum, the peaceful comments attributed to the Iranian president contrast with the more belligerent comments made by the Supreme Leader.

Experts who study Iran note how such contradictions within the political leadership of Iran are not surprising or unusual. Maloney (2015) for example, argues Iran had a reformist president like Rouhani in the 1990s. His name was Mohammad Khatami. Khatami talked about respect for Americans while the Supreme Leader expressed a long-term antipathy toward the United States. However, the push and pull of the presidents and supreme leaders of Iran should not be taken as simply having differences among politicians or political ideologies. Instead, as Giles (2003) notes, the inconsistency of the two leader’s discourse helps the Iranian leadership maintain a form of communication and power which they believe stabilizes their regime. Giles (2003) observes “It has been suggested that Khamenei uses this anti-Western ideology to keep reformist elements in check.” (p.155). Giles argues that the Supreme Leader may need to stoke hardliner sentiments in Iran to be able to allow his nation to move toward more conciliatory communication with the United States.

One of the limitations of this study was the smaller number of speeches made by President Rouhani, and their shorter length, in contrast to Supreme Leader Khamenei, over the year assessed. In order to address this problem, we included an earlier pre-presidential speech from Rouhani that was very lengthy, but in doing so, changed the content of the data to some extent. Therefore, our results include what Rouhani thought and wanted to convey when he was Secretary of the Supreme National Security

Council, from his speech to the United Nations about Iran's nuclear program in 2005. Rouhani's position or message may have changed somewhat between 2005 and 2013, when his role in Iran changed from cabinet member to President. This fact should be considered when assessing the findings of this study. Another consideration is that all of President Rouhani's speeches were written for an external audience (outside Iran), whereas all but one of Supreme Leader Khamenei's speeches were written for Iranian audiences. This could explain to some degree why Rouhani tended to suggest a solution to conflict or improving peace should come from outside Iran, whereas Khamenei suggested that solutions to conflict should come from inside Iran.

It is incumbent on political communication researchers and policy makers to extend the kind of research reported here and to identify patterns of communication and discourse through time and across leaders. In this way, it may be possible to improve how much we understand both the framing of international conflict, and the reasoning behind the conflict, and identify possible diplomatic solutions to ongoing conflicts. Perhaps, as Fialho & Wallin (2013) suggest, better United States-Iran communication reduce the threat Iran appears to pose to American or regional interests in the Middle East. As Alexander George (1993) argues, however, the most useful research on how nations relate to each other must continuously be actor-specific and sensitive to many contextual factors impinging on political decisions. This kind of approach to international communication allows researchers and policy professionals to examine the dynamics of nation-to-nations interactions to move past visceral suppositions about trust or lack of trust and scenarios of likely behaviors that may not be empirically defensible. Methods like the ones use in the study reported here allow key patterns of discourse to emerge from the language used by leaders, while minimizing examiner biases.

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Appendix A

List of Speeches collected for the study

Speaker	Date	Title	Link
Hassan Rouhani	30-Sept-05	Transcript of United Nations address by Dr. Hassan Rouhani, Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council	http://lewis.armscontrolwonk.com/files/2012/08/Rahbord.pdf
Hassan Rouhani	21-Sep-13	Transcript of Ann Curry's interview with Iranian President Rouhani	http://www.nbcnews.com/id/53069733/ns/world_news-mideast_n_africa/t/full-transcript-ann-currys-interview-iranian-president-hassan-rouhani/#.UxZvGvmwJTQ
Hassan Rouhani	24-Sep-13	Statement by Dr. Hassan Rouhani President of the Islamic Republic of Iran at the Sixty-eight Session of the United Nations General Assembly	http://gadebate.un.org/sites/default/files/gastatements/68/IR_en.pdf
Hassan Rouhani	26-Sep-13	Complete Text of Iranian President Hassan Rouhani's Address to Asia Society	http://asiasociety.org/blog/asia/complete-text-iranian-president-hassan-rouhanis-address-asia-society
Hassan Rouhani	25-Nov-13	Supreme Leader's Response to President Rouhani's Letter on Nuclear Negotiations	http://www.leader.ir/langs/en/index.php?p=contentShow&id=11329
Ali Khamenei	26-Jun-13	Supreme Leader's Speech to Judiciary Officials	http://www.leader.ir/langs/en/index.php?p=contentShow&id=10861
Ali Khamenei	09-Aug-13	Supreme Leader's Speech to Government Officials and Ambassadors of Islamic Countries	http://www.leader.ir/langs/en/index.php?p=contentShow&id=10973
Ali Khamenei	28-Aug-13	Supreme Leader's Speech in Meeting with President Rouhani and Cabinet Members	http://www.leader.ir/langs/en/index.php?p=contentShow&id=11046
Ali Khamenei	05-Oct-13	Supreme Leader's Speech in Meeting with Army Cadets	http://www.leader.ir/langs/en/index.php?p=contentShow&id=11173
Ali Khamenei	11-Oct-13	Supreme Leader's Hajj Message	http://www.leader.ir/langs/en/index.php?p=contentShow&id=11187
Ali Khamenei	20-Nov-13	Supreme Leader's Speech in Meeting with Basij Commanders	http://www.leader.ir/langs/en/index.php?p=contentShow&id=11328
Ali Khamenei	15-Dec-13	Supreme Leader's Speech in Meeting with Members of Supreme Council of Cultural Revolution	http://www.leader.ir/langs/en/index.php?p=contentShow&id=11367
Ali Khamenei	09-Jan-14	Supreme Leader's Speech in Meeting with People from the Holy City of Qom	http://www.leader.ir/langs/en/index.php?p=contentShow&id=11381
Ali Khamenei	19-Jan-14	Supreme Leader's Speech in Meeting with Government Officials and Participants of Conference on Islam	http://www.leader.ir/langs/en/index.php?p=contentShow&id=11426
Ali Khamenei	08-Feb-14	Supreme Leader's Speech in Meeting with Air Force Commanders and Personnel	http://www.leader.ir/langs/en/index.php?p=contentShow&id=11472

Appendix B

Qualitative Observations of Rouhani and Supreme Leader Frames

CONFLICT FRAMES
<p>Rouhani: Problem Definition:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Any country portraying Iran as a threat will further destabilize world and regional peace. - Iran not allowed the possession of nuclear technology - Iran's enemies are planning destabilization of the nation.
<p>Supreme Leader: Problem Definition:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -U.S. has an explicit goal to threaten, pressure, intimidate and "make tired," Iran. -Iran wants to be sovereign and separate from the U.S., with its own ideals and power. -The days of compromising to the enemy on their soil is gone. -Islamic countries trying to rid themselves of dictators and corruption will not be very successful if they do not also look at how Western intervention has led to or supported some of the dictatorships. -satanic and arrogant plots of foreign intelligence services and their regional agents -The enemy's responsible for Muslim problems -ill-wishers with grudges against the Revolution. They portray Iran as threat to the whole world. -Arrogance by those who consider themselves to be superior. -Egotism and thinking they can manage do global management.
<p>Rouhani: Causal Analysis:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Israel: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -- "chief agitator." -- false claims about the dangers of Iran to the region. - Possession of nuclear technology will give Iran similar degree of power which US means not being able to pressure anymore - Iran believes it has a right to use nuclear technology and wants that right respected. - Iran is a primary victim of being in the out-group and of being described with derogatory terms. - Scrutiny Iran has received from the United States for their nuclear program derives from the American desire to attack either Iran or Iraq. - The U.S. is openly against Iran and wants to see the demise of the Republic in one form or another. - pressure, arms twisting, intimidation and extraterritorially imposed measures directed against the Iranian people and innocent civilians, trying to prevent them from having access to a whole range of necessities from technology to medicine, from science to food stuff - Western Powers: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -- The Europeans are an alternative to working with the U.S. -- Working with them can help Iran present the USA from taking Iran to the U.N. National Security Council. -- Europeans have animosity toward Muslims. -- Like the U.S., they don't want Iran to have advanced technologies. -- superiority, domination, negation of peace and human dignity, us vs. them thinking, "fanning fear and phobia. " -- Phobias for Islam, Iran, Shia. -- They have goals of threatening and pressuring Iran. Say they do not seek regime change in Iran when they actually do. -- Do not really care about human rights, democracy, or the nuclear issue. -- Dedicated to endangering the independence of Iran. -United States: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> --The U.S. seeks sanctions or military actions against Iran.

- America is a very proud nation.
- America appears to seek ways to ""break the regime in Iran."
- They generally believe that Iran should not be allowed to have nuclear power plants.
- The solution to these problems with the U.S. are found with Iran partnering with the Europeans.
- Iranians have lots of complaints about American policies and American imposed wars.
- Iran cannot forget what the U.S. has done
- The U.S. seeks sanctions or military actions against Iran.
- Needs to resist pressure from""warmongering pressure groups."
- A dominant voice says that military options against Iran are on the table.

Supreme Leader:

Causal Analysis:

- intervention of foreigners.
- Our nuclear program problems and sanctions are because of the U.S. disliking us.
- Problems in nations occur because they need to stand on their own without intervention from other nations.
- The opposing camp which cannot tolerate Islamic Awakening and the dignity of Muslims.
- The opposing camp is using all kinds of psychological, military, security, economic and propaganda tools to suppress Muslims, make them inactive and busy them with trivial things.
- Plots to pit Muslims against Muslims
- United States:
 - Speaks as if it is the leaders of all nations.
 - Does not acknowledge the rights of other nations.
 - USA government keeps a grudge against us. The military threats the U.S. made against us are disgusting and despicable.
 - Backs the "Zionist" regime. Oppresses and attacks people.
 - They slander our religion in the media.
 - U.S. and England used to directly dominate our region, now they try to indirectly dominate through political, economic and cultural controls
 - A power that wants to "Interfere, command and take away" the dignity of Iranians.
 - Independence of nations contradicts their progress. "arrogant system."
 - Its nature is based on imperialism.
 - "warmongering and belligerent."
 - Lying about not wanting to take out present Iranian regime. Politicians make rude statements.
 - Contradictory messages, hypocritical behavior, evil motives.
 - Enemy of Iran.
 - They say that all nations must accept interdependence.
 - They try to direct the decisions of smaller nations.
 - They further their own interests most of all.
- Israel:
 - U.S. and Israel are responsible for Iran's inability to move forward with nuclear technology
 - "fake Zionist regime"
 - illegitimate interests.
 - Europeans flatter these creatures who do not deserve to be called human beings and they humiliate themselves and their people in front of these creatures.
 - The leaders of the Zionist regime are really like wild animals and one cannot call them human beings.
 - "dirty dog of the region."
 - They t to rule over oppressed Palestinians.
- Westerners cannot tolerate Islamic progress and dignity.
- Islamic countries trying to rid themselves of dictators and corruption will not be very successful if they do not also look at how Western intervention has led to or supported some of the dictatorships.
- Wickedness of enemies.
- We are misunderstood when we promote heroic flexibility; it does not mean that our heroes waver, as our

enemies said; it means our heroes maneuver artfully in order to always prevail.

Rouhani:

Moral Judgement:

- Unjust sanctions against Iran is inhumane.
- sanctions are a type of systemic violence
- Iran has also been unjustly labeled a threat to other nations, and there is no evidence to support this.
- Extremists in any nation that have power to pressure the leadership are very dangerous.
- Closed club of nuclear energy - discrimination, non-muslim
- Effects of sanctions cause belligerence and suffering.
- denying the rights for nuclear power
- Sanctions are hurting Iranian people.
- Iran is following the natural right for nuclear technologies that all nations have.

Supreme Leader:

Moral Judgment:

- Iran wants to feel secure, not threatened.
- Morally, in Iran, different religions and different tribes have joined hands and different groups and orientations move forward with unity on the most important issues.
- Iran stands firm in the face of hardships and enemies.
- Allah expects us to never retreat or abandon our position in the face of the enemy.
- transgressors (like the U.S. and Israel) will be "slapped across the face" by Iran and they will never forget it.
- We used to be colonized directly. Then we were indirectly colonized by propping up sympathetic leaders to outside foreign interests.

Rouhani:

Promotion of Solutions to the Problem:

- Iran needs to defend itself while being told by other nations to reveal its plans.
- Possession of nuclear technology will give Iran similar degree of power which US means not being able to pressure anymore.
- War is the old way, the way of the past, for the whole world.
- Iran must not divert its attention from its great achievements.
- Stand firm against them "like a lion."
- Extremism and terrorism are to be routed out.
- making progress and achieving the goals is only possible through carrying out the plans.
- We must rely on our own capacities.
- We must be independent, especially you, the military.
- Other nations respect us, we are popular, and they see us as patient, resisting, and intelligent, despite negative propaganda.

Supreme Leader:

Promotion of Solutions to the Problem:

- Iran can strengthen itself from the inside and maintain its dignity. The Iranian military is an important part of this.
- A solution is religion and unity make resistance against them.
- A solution is to advise the officials of the country, political and religious personalities and those who are influential among the people to lay emphasis, as much as they can, on the valuable unity and solidarity of the Iranian nation."
- Iran should be as self-sufficient as possible.
- Security depends on power and strength of its armed forces.
- Iran can strengthen itself from the inside and maintain its dignity.

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -The Iranian military is an important part of this. -Strengthen brotherhood and cooperation. -He prays that God will ""cut off the hands"" of Western foreigners who have hurt Iran. -Strengthen armed forces. -Unity of Muslims must be stressed ""under the flag of monotheism." -Willpower should overpower the enemies' willpower. -Never retreat from the enemy. -Need to focus on dignity of Islam and humanity. ""heroic flexibility."" --- using different methods to reach goals. -Victory against them is certain with faith. Their ""smile should not be taken seriously."" Do not know Iran or its people. Satan. -We must find strength from within in Muslim communities, not rely on outsiders. -Those that support colonialism must be defeated. Some of them support dictators. -Iranians must focus on internal infrastructures. -Iran cannot lower its defenses against the United States. -Iran must block threats to its national independence.
<p>PEACE FRAMES</p>
<p>Rouhani: Problem Definition:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Iran is no threat to world or regional peace. -Iran is peaceful -Iran does not deserve to be punished. -Iran believes that all challenges can be managed - successfully - through a smart, judicious blend of hope and moderation. -Confrontation will be avoided while national interests are pursued.
<p>Supreme Leader: Problem Definition:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Our enemies have agents inside our country. -We are not against the whole world, just our key enemies who wish to dominate us.
<p>Rouhani: Causal Analysis:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Iranians have a right to "their nuclear activities." -Iranians have a right to "enrichment." -Iran is responsible for peaceful negotiations. -Must push forward with ""nuclear issue"" resolution which other nations seem to not want to get resolved -Suspicious about Iran policies and the new presidents
<p>Supreme Leader: Causal Analysis:</p> <p>--</p>
<p>Rouhani: Moral Judgement:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -WMD are immoral. -Peace is the new way, the way of the future. -Power should not be maintained, by any nation, or group of nations, -Hope is alive and well among most peoples. -Iran respects nations that seek peace. -Iran is opposed to chemical weapons and wars.

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Iran respects nations that seek peace. Iran hates war. Nuclear issue with Iran is ""a very simple matter."" -Iran wants nuclear technology but not nuclear weapons. -Iran is not looking for a win-lose situation but rather a win-win situation -Nuclear weapons are not in Iran's "security and defense doctrine." -The human society should be elevated from a state of mere tolerance to that of collective collaboration. -Iran seeks to resolve problems, not to create them. -People all over the world are tired of war, violence and extremism. -Warmongers are bent on extinguishing all hope. But hope for change for the better is an innate, religious, widespread, and universal concept. -We should start thinking about ""Coalition for Enduring Peace"" all across the globe instead of the ineffective ""Coalitions for War"" in various parts of the world."
<p>Supreme Leader: Moral Judgment:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Martyrdom is beautiful when done to preserve Islam. -We must build up our virtues, such as forgiveness, patience, fortitude, self-control and humility. -We should behave with kindness, diligence and be praiseworthy. -We should work hard. -We have the right to develop nuclear technology
<p>Rouhani: Promotion of Solutions to the Problem:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -political will, logical arguments, no discrimination against Iran. -trust -Iran is not looking for a win-lose situation but rather a win-win situation. -No country by itself and in an isolated way would ever be able to effectively address the challenges it faces." -As we are living in an increasingly interconnected and interdependent world, we believe that challenges could only be addressed through interaction and active cooperation among states. -Global challenges require collective responses. -So, in the name of the Islamic Republic of Iran I propose, as a -starting step, the consideration by the United Nations of the project: ""the World Against -Violence and Extremism."" (WAVE) Let us all join this ""WAVE."" I invite all states, international organizations and civil institutions to undertake a new effort to guide the world in this direction. -Iran is willing to work for cooperation and peace -Iran is peaceful. -Seeks to improve bilateral and multilateral relations with other nations. -Iranians are not terrorists
<p>Supreme Leader: Promotion of Solutions to the Problem:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -We are commanded by the Holy Quran to do good, be kind, be friendly, and seek justice, to embrace other Muslims as brothers, and see anyone else as human beings like ourselves. -American people are human beings like us. -We must rely on our own capacities. -We must be independent, especially you, the military. -Other nations respect us, we are popular, and they see us as patient, resisting, and intelligent, despite negative propaganda. -Our government cannot be toppled because the will of the people is behind it.
<p>AMERICAN-IRAN COMMUNICATION FRAMES:</p>
<p>Rouhani: Problem Definition:</p>

<p>-Iran is wary of the United States invading Iran. -There have been three historical sets of failure in Iranian-American negotiations.</p>
<p>Supreme Leader: Problem Definition: USA: --Seek to prevent the Revolution from "growing roots." --Cannot expect friendship from them. --They interfered with us in the past by saying who we should have relations with, who we should sell our oil to and how much, how we should use it, and who should have responsibilities. --We are not against the people of the U.S. however. --The world sees the U.S. as we do: warmongering, belligerent, interfering and intimidating. --If given the chance, the U.S. would destroy us immediately, despite their claims to the opposite. --The U.S. officials are evil, malevolent, hypocritical, and liars. --The U.S. says it is a friend to the Iranian people, yet it issues threats.</p>
<p>Rouhani: Causal Analysis: -American tells other nations that Iran is lying when it speaks. -Americans tell the Europeans that they are deceived by Iran. -Past tensions mar the relationship today.</p>
<p>Supreme Leader: Causal Analysis: -not to trust the U.S. because it is "pessimistic," "arrogant," and "unreasonable." -comprehensive and advanced propaganda tools -By claiming that they support human rights and democracy, they deceive public opinion in different countries. -The enemy's responsible for the delay of Islamic Awakening. -Islam is under attack from many directions. USA and Israel are two main perpetrators. -Main enemy is ""global arrogance and the criminal Zionist network."" -threatens governments with military attacks, sanctions, and sabotage -USA leads the world today in arrogance and we are hostile to arrogance because it leads the U.S. to think it can interfere in other nations' affairs and bully or pressure them. -They mistakenly see themselves as our boss, and as the owners of our region. If we do not follow, obey and surrender to them, they place no value on our lives. -USA is perpetrator of many crimes against humanity, such as killing and displacing Native Americans and bombing and killing many hundreds of thousands of Japanese, killing thousands in Vietnam and Iraq as well. -They are hypocrites because they try to control the nuclear weapons of other countries when they are the only country that has actually used nuclear weapons against another country. -They are hypocrites because they supplied chemical weapons to Iraq at one time, and now decry the use of chemical weapons by Syria. -The U.S. has no problem committing crimes if there is something it wants. They torture people in Guantanamo without right to trial. T -they take other countries' resources and they enslaved Africans. -The U.S. justifies its violent actions and reframes them as helping some cause. -We should be suspicious of all American presidents, no matter the time frame; they all have a similar anti-Iran agenda. -The U.S. is our enemy and uses many strategies against us. -You Americans have your own problems; go worry about those instead of threatening and sanctioning us. -islam opposes the malevolent Zion (Israel). -The Palestinians continue to stand up to Israel and gave them a slap in the face with recent military actions.</p>

<p>Rouhani: Moral Judgement: -Iran does not support terrorism but promotes peace -They now see the failure of their sanctions on Iran. They have learned that respect and "honorable negotiations" are what work. -They now see the failure of their sanctions on Iran. They have learned that respect and ""honorable negotiations"" are what work."</p>
<p>Supreme Leader: Moral Judgement: -We are pessimistic about the Americans." -"We do not trust them at all." -"arrogant," "unreasonable." -The U.S. is the greatest violator of human rights in the past and now. -They kill innocent people and commit crimes against humanity worldwide, yet they hypocritically claim to be proponents of human rights. -America supports our other enemy Zion (Israel).</p>
<p>Rouhani: Promotion of Solutions to the Problem: -Iran wants America to acknowledge its rights to a ""peaceful pursuit of nuclear technology." -Iran respects logic and expects dignity in negotiations. -Good will and good intentions must be in place. -"mutual confidence and trust"" are also necessary. -Nation leaders must try and remove walls of mistrust and suspicion. -An atmosphere of friendship and kindness should be obtained. -Iran wants respect from the U.S. -But that does not preclude moving forward to try to find some common ground with the U.S. and repair some of the relationship. -Iran seeks to end the tensions from the past. -Need to focus on the future and current situations. -Should build on common concerns. -mutual respect and with honorable negotiations -Iran does not seek a win-lose result. -Ready to engage in talks that build confidence</p>
<p>Supreme Leader: Promotion of Solutions to the Problem: -We do not see American people as enemies, even though we view their government as arrogant, hostile, and evil. -We will negotiate with this Satan (the U.S.) in order to eradicate its evil deeds, but that does not mean we are desperate or capitulating. -Now all nations realize the U.S. is our enemy.</p>